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Abstract
Eﬃcient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is
rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Diﬀerent mechanisms have
been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for reasons I discuss
in the paper, I find these mechanisms of limited use. I propose a much simpler mechanism
that implements the first-best for any number of firms: a uniform price sealed-bid auction
of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues
given back to firms. Paybacks, which decrease with the number of firms, are such that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non-cooperatively
or collusively. (JEL D44, D62, D82)
1 Introduction
Regulatory authorities generally find that part of the information they need for implementing
an eﬃcient regulation is in the hands of those who are to be regulated. Regulating externalities
such as access to common resources (e.g., clean air, water streams, fisheries, etc.) is not the
exception. Environmental regulators, for example, know little about firms’ pollution abatement
costs, so without communicating with firms they would be unable to establish the eﬃcient level
of pollution. Diﬀerent mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private
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information but for reasons I discuss below I find these mechanisms of limited use. In this paper,
I propose a simpler and more eﬀective mechanism: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an
endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given
back to firms.1 The mechanism is developed under the additional assumption that firms know
nothing about the other firms’ characteristics (they may be even unaware of the number of
firms being regulated).
Following Weitzman (1974), several authors have looked for ways in which to improve upon
his fixed tax or license scheme. Roberts and Spence’s (1976) hybrid tax/license scheme can in
principle implement the first-best when there is an infinitely large number of firms and the regu-
lator is free to impose a tax schedule (as opposed to a fixed tax) and issue a continuum of license
types, with each type clearing at a diﬀerent price. Building also upon the assumption of per-
fect competition in the license market, Kwerel (1977) develops a much simpler subsidy/license
scheme that supposedly implements the first-best; although not in dominant strategies. Re-
laxing the perfect competition assumption, Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980) propose
a Vickrey-Clarke-Goves (VCG) mechanism that implements the first-best in dominant strate-
gies.2 Maintaining the few-firms assumption and adding complete information by firms, in a
more recent paper Duggan and Roberts (2002) advance a quantity-based scheme in which each
firm chooses the number of licenses for itself and for its "neighbor."3
With the exception of Kwerel (1977), the fact that these first-best mechanisms are highly
non-linear, firm-specific and/or depending on a complete information assumption complicates
their practical implementation.4 In fact, we do not see anything like it being applied in practice
or, at least, under consideration. In Kwerel’s scheme, on the other hand, the regulator allocates
a fixed number of transferable licenses to firms (possibly proportional to historic use as typically
done in practice) and establishes a subsidy per license to be paid to any firm holding licenses in
excess of its needs. Both the total number of licenses and the subsidy level are calculated on the
basis of the information provided by firms. Although this scheme has been criticized because it
requires perfect competition in the license market,5 it has the advantage of being constructed
1Licenses are generally refered to as permits or allowances in water and air pollution control, as rights in water
supply management and as quotas in fisheries management. In this paper, I will use the term license throughout.
2See also Spulber (1988).
3 In the context of pure private externalities, Varian (1994) also oﬀers a simple multistage mechanism in
which firms announce Pigouvian taxes. Firms are, as in Duggan and Roberts (2002), assumed to have complete
information about other firms’ characteristics.
4Evidence of significant information asymmetries across firms facing a commons problem is provided, for
example, by Wiggins and Libecap (1985).
5This assumption seems adequate for many of the existing license markets (Tietenberg, 2003). Nevertheless,
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upon instruments currently used in practice.6 The problem with Kwerel’s scheme, however, is
that it does not work. I will show below that the combination of a free allocation of licenses
with a subsidy creates perverse incentives for firms not to reveal their true types, as originally
claimed, but to over-report their demand for licenses to the maximum extent possible.
One might argue that a quick way to fix Kwerel’s scheme, while maintaining its relatively
simple structure, is by allocating the licenses via a uniform-price auction in which each firm
bids a demand schedule indicating the number of licenses willing to purchase at any given price.
Unfortunately, these multi-unit auctions have their own problems as well. As first recognized by
Wilson (1979) in his pioneer "auctions of shares" article (see also Milgrom [2004]), even when
there is a large number of bidders, uniform price auctions can exhibit Nash equilibria with
prices far below the competitive price (the price that would prevail if all bidders submit their
true demand curves). The reason for this is that uniform pricing creates strong incentives for
bidders to (non-cooperatively) reduce their demand schedules in order to depress the price they
pay for their inframarginal units. Therefore, anticipating a low-price equilibrium at the auction
(most likely zero, or the reserve price if there is any), firms would find it again profitable to
over-report their demand functions by as much as possible in order to acquire a large volume of
licences that can then be sold back to the government at a price much higher than the auction
clearing price.7
Diﬀerent solutions have been advanced in dealing with this low-price equilibria phenom-
enon. One radical solution is to give up the uniform-price format altogether and opt for a
discriminatory-price format (e.g., Ausubel, 2004; Vickrey, 1961). But within the uniform-price
format, diﬀerent authors have also been looking for ways in which changing auction rules could
eliminate underpricing. Kremer and Nyborg (2004), for example, propose changing the alloca-
tion rule (i.e., the way the asset is divided when there is excess demand at the clearing price)
from the usual marginal pro rata tie-breaking rule to a total pro rata rule.8 More recently,
Kwerel’s scheme does become unworkable if firms’ pollutant are not perfect substitutes in the social damage
function (Dasgupta et el., 1980).
6Note that in Kwerel’s truth-telling equilibrium subsidy payments are never triggered.
7Some readers may argue that removing the subsidy and having it replaced by a price floor (of equal magni-
tude) would finally solve matters. As we shall see, it does not do so for the exact opposite reasons. Anticipating
the reserve price as the auction clearing price, firms would have incentives to deviate from truth-telling by under-
reporting their demand curves in order to decrease the reserve price. The expectation of a (non-cooperative)
low-price equilibrium acts as coordinating monopsonist device.
8For the change in the allocation rule to have an eﬀect on clearing prices, bidders must be allowed to submit
discountinuous demand schedules, which, by construction, is not possible in Wilson (1979). But unlike in Kremer
and Nyborg (2004) where bidders have a constant valuation for the asset, in our context this allocation rule change
is of little help because bidders do have fairly continuos downward sloping demand curves.
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McAdams (2005) eliminates underpricing by letting the auctioneer not to commit to a fixed
quantity and reserve price ex-ante. Bidders only learn about the total quantity sold by the
auctioneer once the auction is concluded.
In this paper I propose a mechanism that builds upon a conventional uniform price sealed-
bid auction but introduces two key ingredients. First, I let the total number of licenses be
endogenous to the demand schedules submitted by firms. This is a most natural thing to
do in our context because the regulator is clueless about the eﬃcient number of licenses to
be allocated before communicating with firms. But unlike in McAdams (2005), this "flexible
supply" feature by itself does not fully solve the underpricing problem.9 Hence, I introduce
a second ingredient: paybacks or rebates. Part of the auction revenues are returned to firms
not as lump sum transfers but in a way that firms would have incentives to bid truthfully.
While paybacks may seem odd in other contexts,10 they are not new in existing auctions for
"protecting the commons".11 Furthermore, an auction with paybacks seem to be a natural
point of departure for any license-type regulatory proposal given the mixed experience with
allocating licenses (grandfather allocation vs auction allocation) that is observed in existing
programs across a variety of areas including air-pollution control, water supply management
and fisheries management (Tietenberg, 2003).12
The incorporation of these two key ingredients –endogenous supply and paybacks– into
a uniform price auction is not only simple but remarkably eﬀective in implementing the first-
best. Paybacks are structured in such a way that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for firms
regardless of whether they behave non-cooperatively or collusively. All firms pay the exact same
price at the margin for licenses (in or oﬀ equilibrium) but their paybacks may diﬀer unless they
have identical demand functions. Paybacks, however, will rapidly fall with the number of firms
and as the number of firms grow large the auction scheme converges to the Pigouvian solution
(Pigou, 1920).
There is a close connection between the auction proposed in this paper and the discrimi-
natory auctions of Vickrey (1961) and Ausubel (2004). Despite the quite diﬀerent structures,
9 It only works in the limit, when there is an infinitely large number of firms so that paybacks are virtually
zero. Part of the reason why "flexible supply" is not suﬃcient is because I work with a very diﬀerent set of
assumptions than McAdam (2005). I let firms to be asymmetric, to have downward sloping demand curves and
to know nothing about other firms’ characteristics. In addition, my auctioneer’s objective function is not to
maximize revenues but social welfare.
10Not surprisingly they are absent in recent books by Milgrom (2004) and Kemplerer (2004).
11See, for example, the US EPA auction for sulfur dioxide allowances (Joskow et al, 1998).
12See also Cramton and Kerr (1999) for related arguments.
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the total payment in the auction mechanism is not diﬀerent than the payment rules of Vickrey
(1961) and Ausubel (2004). The reason is that all these three auctions are constructed upon
the same principle. In Vickrey and Ausubel auctions each bidder is asked to pay an amount
equal to the "pecuniary externality" she exerts on the other competing bidders while here each
bidder is asked to pay an amount equal to the (additional) externality she imposes on society.
The auction mechanism can be certainly viewed as a VCG mechanism in that it makes
each firm to pay only for the externality she exerts on society. It departs, however, from the
conventional VCG mechanism, as implemented by Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin (DHM),13 in
at least three fundamental ways. First, payments in the auction mechanism do not follow the
two-part structure of DHM (there is, for instance, no such constant term constructed upon
other firms’ reports). Second, unlike the auction mechanism, the DHM mechanism fails to
allocate licenses eﬃciently across firms when the aggregate supply of licenses is fixed. This is
because each individual firm is no longer pivotal under DHM, i.e., its report does not aﬀect the
aggregate supply (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004).14 This is quite an important distinction because
in many commons problems the aggregate supply is likely to be fixed, either because of the
presence of some genuine threshold or, more likely, because the auctioneer/regulator has no
control over the aggregate supply. Third, the DHM mechanism fails to deliver the first-best
when firms are acting collusively unless the constant term is set to zero. When we do that,
collusive and non-cooperative behavior are indeed no diﬀerent but payments become so large
(i.e., the full social cost) that the (now Groves) mechanism becomes of little practical value.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section I present the modelling
assumptions and a brief discussion of Kwerel’s scheme. In Section 3 I present the auction mech-
anism; first for a single firm and then for multiple firms. In Section 4 I study how the mechanism
performs under collusive behavior. In Section 5 I extend the mechanism to accommodate for
firm-specific (i.e., no transferable) licenses and for the existence of private externalities. Con-
cluding remarks are in Section 6.
13Recall that in DHM each firm, say i, faces a tax schedule equal to the total pollution damages plus the
clean-up cost of all the remaining firms minus a constant term that is independent of firm i’s report. Although
DHM is not specific about the latter, we know that in a VCG mechanism the constant term is made equal to
the social cost (total damages and clean-up costs) associated to the eﬃcient allocation in the absence of firm i.
14To be more specific let x be the aggregate supply and n the number of (asymmetric) firms. Under the DHM
scheme, one of the multiple (ineﬃcient) Nash equilibria is for each firm to submit a null report and then produce
x/n (or alternatively, report that there are no clean up costs up to x/n).
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2 The model
To facilitate the exposition I will develop the model for the case of a classical pollution exter-
nality (which would correspond to an auction of shares with variable supply). In subsequent
sections I extend the model to other commons problems including those in which licenses are
firm-specific and where firms impose (private) externalities on each other.
2.1 Notation and first-best allocation
Consider n ≥ 1 firms (i = 1, ..., n). All firms are assumed to have inverse demand functions
for pollution of the form Pi(xi) with P 0i (xi) < 0, where xi is firm i’s pollution level that is
accurately monitored by the regulator (In some cases I will work with the demand function,
which is denoted by Xi(p) with X 0i(p) < 0, where p is the price of pollution). Function Pi(·) is
only known by firm i, neither by the regulator nor by other firms. The aggregate demand curve
for pollution is denoted by P (x), where x =
Pn
i=1 xi is total pollution. The social damage
caused by pollution x is D(x) with D(0) = 0, D0(x) > 0 and D00(x) ≥ 0. D0(x) can be
interpreted more generally as the regulator’s supply function for licenses. We may want to
assume that D(x) is publicly known but it is actually not necessary.
In the absence of regulation firm i would emit x0i , where Pi(x
0
i ) = 0. Hence, firm i’s cost of
reducing emissions from x0i to some level xi < x
0
i is Ci(xi) =
R x0i
xi
Pi(z)dz (note that −C 0i(xi) ≡
Pi(xi)), and the minimum total cost of achieving pollution level x < x0 is C(x) =
R x0
x P (z)dz.
The regulator’s objective is to minimize the sum of clean-up costs and damages from pol-
lution, i.e., C(x) + D(x). Therefore, the socially optimal or first-best pollution level x∗ < x0
satisfies
P (x∗) = D0(x∗) = Pi(x∗i ) for all i = 1, ..., n (1)
But the regulator cannot directly implement the first-best allocation because he does not know
the demand functions Pi(·). He must then look for mechanisms in which it is in the firms’ best
interest to communicate their private information to him. Kwerel’s scheme is supposedly one
of such mechanisms for the case in which there is a large number of firms.
2.2 Kwerel’s scheme
To appreciate the workings of my auction scheme it is useful to start by understanding firms’
incentives under Kwerel’s scheme. This latter proves to be interesting in itself because, as we
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shall see below, the scheme does not work as intended.
Kwerel’s mechanism is based on the combination of two instruments: a free allocation of
a total of l transferable licenses and a subsidy of s per license to be paid to any firm holding
licenses in excess of its emissions.15 The regulator asks firms to report their demand curves
after they are informed that the parameters l are s are to be set according to
s = Pˆ (l) = D0(l) (2)
where Pˆ (·) is the aggregate demand curve built upon individual reports Pˆi(xi).
Assuming that the market for licenses is competitive, it must hold in equilibrium that
Pi(xi) ≡ −C 0i(xi) = p and xi = li for all i = 1, ..., n, where p denote the market price of licenses.
Firms equate marginal abatement costs to the market price and keep a number of licenses just
to cover their emissions. Kwerel argues that this simple scheme induces each firm i to report
its true demand curve Pi(·) as long as it believes all other firms are telling the truth. In other
words, truth-telling is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
Kwerel’s logic can be easily explained with the aid of Figure 1. Figure 1a depicts the
situation in which a firm or a group of firms over-report their demand curves such that the
reported aggregate demand curve is Pˆ (x) instead of the true curve P (x).16 The license and
subsidy parameters take the values of lˆ and sˆ, respectively, which are above their first-best
levels l∗ and s∗. Since the government is buying back licenses at price sˆ, the market equilibrium
price of licenses is not p0 (as if no license were sell back to the government) but p = sˆ > p∗.
On aggregate, firms sell back lˆ − xˆ licenses, so total pollution falls below its first-best level to
xˆ < l∗. Figure 1b, on the other hand, depicts the under-reporting situation. Given the reported
aggregate demand curve P˜ (x), the license and subsidy parameters take now the values of l˜ and
s˜, respectively. The market equilibrium price is p = p˜ > p∗ and total pollution is x = l˜ < l∗.
From inspection of these two cases it should become evident that no matter what firms report
15To be fair, Kwerel (1977) is never explicit about allocating the licenses for free (neither about auctioning
them oﬀ); he instead talks about licenses that are issued and the existence of a market for licenses. Besides,
there is no much we can infer from the firm’s cost minimizing problems laid out in pags. 596 and 597 because
of the price-taking behavior (i.e., any grandfathered allocation can be omitted from the minimization problem
since it is a lump-sum transfer with no eﬀect on the firm’s abatement decision). But had the author been aware
that the scheme would work diﬀerently depending on whether the licenses are grandfathered or auctioned oﬀ,
he would have explicitly said so. I thank the author for clarifying to me that the paper was in fact developed
having in mind a free allocation of licenses, which is also the interpretation that one grasps from reading other
papers of the time (e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1976; Dasgupta et al., 1980).
16There is an implicit assumption in Kwerel’s work that each firms is able to move the curve.
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to the regulator the market equilibrium price of licenses is given by p = max{P (x),D0(x)}.
Hence, the minimum possible equilibrium price for licenses is pmin = P (x∗) = D0(x∗), which
is obtained when all firms report their true demand curves. Based on this observation, Kwerel
closes his proof by arguing that since each firm’s compliance cost is an increasing function of
p, no firm has incentives to move the aggregate demand curve from its actual value, whatever
it is, when it believes that all the other firms are telling the truth.17
Unfortunately, Kwerel’s logic has a fundamental flaw in that it neglects the revenues ac-
cruing to firms from selling licenses back to the government. After taking these extra revenues
into account, it is not diﬃcult to show that firms have no incentives to tell the truth but to
over-report their demand curves. To see this, simply go back to Figure 1a and compare the
total compliance costs when reporting the true aggregate demand curve P (x) with those when
reporting Pˆ (x). Total costs under truth-telling correspond exclusively to abatement costs (area
x0l∗E) while under over-reporting to abatement costs (area x0xˆA) minus license sales to the
government (area lˆxˆAB). Clearly, the regulation has turned out to be quite a profitable busi-
ness for firms, and more so the higher the degree of over-reporting. More generally, it can be
established
Proposition 1 The unique (Nash-equilibrium) outcome in Kwerel’s scheme is for firms to
over-report their demand curves as to ensure the maximum possible number of licenses and
subsidy level.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Despite its fundamental flaw, Kwerel’s scheme has an element that I also use in constructing
the auction mechanism that I present next. Under this new scheme firms are also communicated
in advance that the information they report to the regulator will be used in a form similar to
expression (2); although with some key diﬀerences.
3 The auction mechanism
The best way to appreciate the workings of the auction mechanism is in the context of a single
firm. I will then show how the scheme extends to the case of multiple (non-cooperative) firms.
17Kwerel also mentions the existence of multiple "oﬀsetting-lies" Nash equilibria in which two or more firms
send false reports that, on aggregate, add to the true demand curve P (x). Without knowing the actual P (x),
however, it is hard to see how firms could coordinate in one of these "oﬀsetting-lies" Nash equilibria.
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3.1 Single firm
Consider a single firm with demand curve P (x) ≡ −C0(x). The auction scheme operates as
follows:
(i) firm is informed in advance about the auction rules (including the way the paybacks are
computed)
(ii) firm is asked to bid a non-increasing inverse demand schedule Pˆ (x) (or equivalently, a
non-increasing demand schedule Xˆ(p))
(iii) the auctioneer/regulator clears the auction (i.e., determines p and l) according to
p = Pˆ (l) = D0(l) (3)
(iv) the firm receives l licenses and pay p for each license
(v) the firm gets a fraction α(l) of the auction revenues back (i.e., payback is α(l)pl)
With the aid of Figures 1a and 1b we can see that is not socially optimal for the regulator
to set the fraction α(l) equal to either 1 or 0. If the regulator keeps no revenue for himself
(i.e., α(l) = 1), the firm has incentives to over-report by as much as to postpone any abatement
eﬀort. As shown in Figure 1a, by submitting Pˆ (x) instead of P (x), the firm is able to reduce
its compliance cost from area x0l∗E to area x0xˆA minus lˆxˆAB and abate far less than the
first-best level. Conversely, if the regulator keeps all the auction revenues for himself (i.e.,
α(l) = 0), the firm has incentives to under-report to some optimal extent. As shown in Figure
1b, by submitting P˜ (x) instead of P (x), the firm is able to reduce its compliance cost from
area x00p∗E to area x00s˜FBE. The firm’s optimal under-reporting in this case balances at the
margin the gains from getting a lower price for licenses with the losses from higher abatement. In
terms of Figure 1b, the optimal under-reporting is found by maximizing the diﬀerence between
area F s˜p∗A and area ABE.
To find the function α(l) that just induces the firm to submit its true demand curve and
hence allows the regulator to implement the first-best, we proceed by backward induction.
Given some function α(l), the firm’s problem is to find the demand schedule Pˆ (x) that solves
minC(l) + pl − α(l)pl (4)
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subject to (3).
Using the auction clearing equation (3) we can replace p by D0(l) in (4), and since there is
a one-to-one correspondence between a demand schedule Pˆ (x) and the number of licenses l, at
least in the range of prices the firm expects the auction to clear, the firm’s first order condition
is given by
C 0(l) +D0(l) +D00(l)l − α0(l)D0(l)l − α(l)(D00(l)l +D0(l)) = 0 (5)
Note that if we plug α(l) = 1 into (5), the latter reduces to P (l = x0) = 0, which is the no-
regulation solution. If, on the other hand, we plug α(l) = 0 into (5), we obtain the monopsonist
solution l#, where 0 < l# < l∗.
Anticipating (5), the regulator’s problem is to find the function α(l) that induces the firm
to deliver the first-best allocation, i.e., C 0(l∗) +D0(l∗) = 0 (or P (l∗) = D0(l∗)). Such function
solves the diﬀerential equation
α0(l) + α(l)
µ
D00(l)l +D0(l)
D0(l)l
¶
=
D00(l)
D0(l)
(6)
The function α(l) that results from solving (6) is the function the regulator informs the firm
along with the other auction rules in step (i) above.
Interestingly enough, the function α(l) only depends on the shape of the marginal damage
function and not on the demand schedule submitted by the firm. If, for example, D0(x) = hx,
where h is some constant parameter, the diﬀerential equation (6) reduces to α0(l)+2α(l)/l = 1/l,
which has a unique solution: α(l) = 1/2.18 The reason why α(l) does not depend on the firm’s
bid –a property that is not unique to the single-firm case but extends also to the multi-firm
case– is simply because the firm’s cost minimization problem pays explicit attention to the
auction clearing equation (3).
Furthermore, if the function α(l) is such that the firm is delivering the first-best l∗ it must
be the case that the firm is solving the regulator’s problem up front. In other words, the last
two terms of eq.(4) must add to C(l), which leads to (recall that p = D0(l))
Proposition 2 The payback function is given by
α(l) = 1− D(l)
D0(l)l
18Strictly speaking the general solution is α(l) = 1/2 +K/l2 where K is an integration constant. But since
α(l) cannot go unbounded as l approaches zero, K must be set to zero.
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Proof. Let
g(l) = exp
Z
D00(l)l +D0(l)
D0(l)l
dl = exp
Z
d ln(D0(l)l) = D0(l)l
Then the solution to the diﬀerential equation (6) for 0 ≤ l <∞ is given by
α(l) =
1
g(l)
µ
K +
Z
g(l)
D00(l)
D0(l)
dl
¶
=
1
D0(l)l
µ
K +
Z
D00(l)ldl
¶
where K is an integration constant. Integrating by parts, we obtain
α(l) =
1
D0(l)l
(K +D0(l)l −D(l))
and setting the constant term K to zero19 finishes the proof.
Since D0(l) is a non-decreasing function of l it is clear that 0 ≤ α(l) ≤ 1, so the final price
paid by the firm for each license (i.e., (1 − α)p), is at most equal to marginal damage D0(l).
Plugging back the function α(l) of Proposition 2 into the firm’s objective function (4) it is
immediately seen that the new auction scheme has indeed converted the firm’s problem into
the regulator’s by making the firm bear the full cost of the pollution damages.
The idea of requiring the firm to pay D(l) is certainly not new. For example, the DHM
mechanism for the case of a single firm reduces precisely to the regulator informing the firm that
it faces a tax function T (x) = D(x), where x is the firm’s observed pollution level (note also that
because there is only one firm the regulator does not need the firm to report any cost/demand
information to him). The auction mechanism implements the same result but in a diﬀerent way.
Here the regulator asks the firm to submit a demand schedule that it is then used to compute
the optimal number of licenses and the price to be charged for each license. In other words,
the pollution cap is set ex-ante, i.e, before pollution occurs. It that sense the auction scheme
fully decouples the regulatory design from the enforcement/monitoring activity like in any other
quantity-based regulation –whether it is based on standards or transferable licenses– which
today is by far the more prevalent type of regulation for protecting the commons.20 Other
diﬀerences will become evident as we consider more than one firm.
19Note that liml→0D(l)/D0(l)l = 1, so for α(l) not to explode as l approaches zero, K must be set to zero (see
also footnote 19).
20 It is easy, however, to transform the DHM into a quantity-based mechanism by simply allocating licenses at
the reported first-best levels and asking firms to pay for them according to their individual tax schedules.
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But before moving to the multiple-firm case it is worth mentioning that if our single firm
knows the function D(x), it does not need to truthfully bid its entire demand schedule but
only the portion relevant to the auction clearing. It could for instance submit the perfectly
inelastic demand schedule Xˆ(p) = l∗.21 More importantly, although I have developed the
auction mechanism as if the firm knew the damage function D(x), it should be clear by now
that the firm does not actually need to know D(x), and hence α(l), for the auction mechanism
to work in providing incentives for truthful revelation. We only require the firm to believe that
it is facing a regulator committed to implement the first-best for whatever function D(x) he
has in mind. And if the firm does indeed know little about D(x), it will truthfully bid its
(almost) entire demand schedule to make sure that for any possible function D(x) chosen by
the regulator it will get the first-best level of licenses.
3.2 Multiple firms: Non-cooperative equilibrium
Let us now consider the incomplete information game of n ≥ 2 firms with Pi(xi) being firm i’s
private information. The auction mechanism extends as follows
(i) firms are informed in advance about the auction rules (including the way payback functions
are computed)
(ii) firm i (= 1, ..., n) is asked to bid a non-increasing inverse demand schedule Pˆi(xi) (or,
equivalently, a non-increasing demand schedule Xˆi(p))
(iii) the regulator computes the residual marginal damage function (i.e., residual supply func-
tion) for each firm i using other firms’ demand schedules, that is
D0i(xi) ≡ D0(x)− Pˆ−i(x−i) (7)
where Pˆ−i(x−i) is the demand schedule from aggregating all other bids besides firm i’s
and xi ≡ x − x−i ≥ 0 (note that since xi ≥ 0, D0i(xi) is only defined at and above the
point at which D0(x) = Pˆ−i(x−i); see Figure 2)22
(iv) entering D0i(li) and Di(li) ≡
R li
0 D
0
i(l)dl into Proposition 2 the regulator computes a func-
tion αi(li) for each firm
21Here the relevant range has reduced to a single point, that is p∗ = D0(l∗).
22 In terms of demand and supply functions, firm i’s residual supply function would beXrsi (p) = Xs(p)−Xˆd−i(p),
where D0i(Xrsi (p)) = p, D0(Xs(p)) = p and Pˆ−i(Xˆd−i(p)) = p.
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(v) the regulator clears the auction by determining a price pi and number licenses li for each
bidder i according to
pi = Pˆi(li) = D0i(li)
(vi) firm i purchases li licenses at a price pi each, and soon after gets a payback of αi(li)pili
Proposition 3 In the auction mechanism described above it is optimal for each firm i to bid
its true demand curve Pi(xi) regardless of what other firms bid.
Proof. It follows immediately from the construction of αi(li) in Proposition 2.
Truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy for firms, so there is no need for them to form
beliefs about other firms’ types and/or actions. The immediate implication of Proposition 2
is that this auction scheme implements the first-best with each firm facing the same price at
the margin (i.e., pi = p∗ for all i) and getting exactly the first-best allocation of licenses (i.e.,
li = x∗i ), which eliminates (eﬃciency) reasons for trading licenses after the auction.
23 These
eﬃciency properties can be readily seen in Figure 2: if Pˆi(xi) = Pi(xi) and Pˆ−i(x−i) = P−i(x−i),
then li = x∗i , l = x
∗ and pˆ = p∗.
Although in principle the auctioneer (i.e., regulator) goes bidder after bidder determining
individual prices pi, these prices are all the same regardless of how truthful firms are (in terms
of Figure 2: p1 = ... = pn = pˆ). But because of the existence of paybacks, one may still question
the uniform-price format of the auction. Unless firms have identical demand curves, final prices,
(1−αi)p, will diﬀer across firms (in and oﬀ equilibrium). But in equilibrium they will diﬀer in
a most equitable way. From Proposition 2 we know that αi(li) is such that
Proposition 4 In the auction mechanism described above firm i’s total payment in equilib-
rium is exactly equal to the residual (or additional) damage caused by its pollution, i.e., (1 −
αi(l∗i ))p
∗l∗i = Di(l
∗
i ), where Di(li) ≡
R li
0 D
0
i(z)dz.
This is a very important result for the purposes of practical implementation. It is hard to
imagine of a more equitable and eﬃcient way to allocate the total cost of the pollution external-
ity. Proposition 4 also allows us to see the close connection that exists between the uniform-price
auction mechanism and the (also private-value) discriminatory auctions of Vickrey (1961) and
Ausubel (2004). In both of these discriminatory auctions, where the total number of licenses
23Note also that there is no need for formally modelling the after-auction market since no firm can profit from
it by misreporting at the auction.
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is known ex-ante, bidder i pays a diﬀerent price for each item she gets and possibly diﬀerent
prices than j’s, but the total payment of i is equal to the area under the her residual supply
function.24 Despite the quite diﬀerent structures, it should not be surprising that the total
payment in the uniform-price auction mechanism follows the exact payment rule of Vickrey
(1961) and Ausubel (2004). The reason is that all these three auctions are constructed upon
the same principle. In Vickrey and Ausubel auctions each bidder is asked to pay an amount
equal to the "pecuniary externality" she exerts on the other competing bidders while here each
bidder is asked to pay an amount equal to the (residual) externality she imposes on society.
Based on the payment rule of Proposition 4, the auction mechanism can be certainly viewed
as a VCG mechanism in that it makes each firm to pay only for the externality she exerts on
society. It is, however, structurally diﬀerent than the more conventional VCG mechanism as
implemented by DHM. Letting θi identify firm i’s true type, in DHM firm i faces a tax schedule
Ti(xi) equal to
Ti(xi) = D(xi +
P
j 6=i
x∗j (θˆi, θˆ−i)) +
P
j 6=i
Cj(x∗j (θˆi, θˆ−i), θˆj)−Ai(θˆ−i) (8)
where θˆi is firm i’s report to the regulator, θˆ−i is the vector of firms j 6= i’s reports, x∗j (θˆi, θˆ−i)
is firm j’s first-best pollution level as dictated by the reports of all firms, and Ai is a constant
term independent of firm i’s report. Although DHM is not specific about the Ai’s,25 we know
that for DHM to be a VCG mechanism the constant term Ai is made equal to the eﬃcient
social cost had firm i not existed, that is
Ai(θˆ−i) = D(x∗∗−i) +
P
j 6=i
Cj(x∗∗j (θˆ−i), θˆj)
where x∗∗−i ≡
P
j 6=i x
∗∗
j (θˆ−i) and x
∗∗
j (θˆ−i) is firm j’s first-best pollution level in the absence of
firm i.
Firm i’s total payments under the auction mechanism and under the DHM mechanism
will be exactly the same in equilibrium (but not oﬀ-equilibrium),26 although computed in
structurally diﬀerent ways. This can be easily shown with the aid of Figure 2. Firm i’s
24 If l is the volume of licenses to be auctioned oﬀ, firm i’s residual supply function is l− Xˆ−i(p), where Xˆ−i(p)
is the sum of the bids submitted by all other bidders.
25One does not need to be specific in order to implement the first-best if there are no restrictions on firms’
payments.
26But diﬀerent oﬀ equilibrium they are not the same.
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total payment under the auction mechanism is the shaded area to the left while the payment
under the DHM mechanism is the shaded area to the right (recall that li = xˆ− xˆ−i). Despite
the similarities, the structural diﬀerences will prove critical in explaining why in some other,
yet important, circumstances the auction mechanism continues to perform equally well (i.e.,
delivering the eﬃcient allocation) while the DHM mechanism does not.
3.3 Properties of the mechanism
The main property of the auction mechanism is that it delivers the first-best for any number
of firms and irrespective of how well-informed firms are. There are four additional properties
(related to the evolution of paybacks, perfectly elastic/inelastic supply curve, oﬀ-equilibrium
behavior, and budget balancing) that may be important for purposes of practical implemen-
tation. First, while the payment rule of Proposition 4 allows for final prices to diﬀer across
firms, it does it in an equitable way, and more so if as we increase the number of firms, the αi’s
rapidly fall towards zero. Although the αi’s are never exactly equal to zero, when there is a
large number of firms, firm i has virtually no eﬀect on the equilibrium price, so D0i(x
∗
i ) ≈ D0i(0).
And by replacing D00i (xi) = 0 into (6), the diﬀerential equation’s unique solution happens to
be αi(li) = 0; hence, the auction scheme has converged to the Pigouvian principle for taxing
externalities (Pigou, 1920).
To illustrate how rapidly the auction’s payment rule approaches Pigou’s, let us consider
a numerical example. Suppose there are n symmetric firms with linear demand curves. The
aggregate demand curve is P (x) = p¯(1 − x/x0), where p¯ is the choke price and x0 is the
unregulated level of pollution. The damage function is D0(x) = hx. Solving as a function of
the number of firms, we obtain
α(n) =
1
2
p¯
(n− 1)hx0 + np¯ (9)
If we further let the slopes of the aggregate demand and marginal damage curves be the same
(i.e., h = p¯/x0), then eq. (9) reduces to α(n) = 1/(4n− 2). The rebate for three firms is 10%,
for ten firms is 2.6%, and for 100 firms is less than 0.3%.
Second, it is well known that if D0(x) is constant a first-best policy is to charge a Pigouvian
tax equal to D0. The auction mechanism is equivalent to this tax policy in that paybacks are
exactly equal to zero but it still has the (practical) advantage that the socially eﬃcient amount
of pollution is revealed ex-ante, i.e., before pollution occurs.
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More interestingly, if the supply curve is totally inelastic, say, at x = x¯, whether because
there is a genuine threshold at x¯ or, more likely, because the regulator has no control over x, the
auction mechanism still retains its truth-telling properties (note that each firm faces a elastic
residual supply function).27 This latter has two important implications. On the one hand, it
makes the auction mechanism readily comparable to the (fixed-supply) private-value auctions
of Vickrey and Ausubel. In fact, the three auctions yield the same outcome in terms of revenues
and allocations; although they are implemented in quite diﬀerent ways. On the other hand,
it introduces a sharp distinction between the auction mechanism and the DHM mechanism.
DHM fails to yield the eﬃcient outcome because each individual firm is no longer pivotal, i.e.,
its report does not aﬀect the aggregate supply. DHM can lead, for example, to the ineﬃcient
Nash equilibrium in which each of the (no necessarily symmetric) n firms submit a null report
(or that there are no clean up costs up to x¯/n) and then emit x¯/n. This equilibrium strategy
reduces payments to zero and clearly no firm wants to deviate from it (note that above x¯ firms
face an infinitely large pollution fee).
Third, unlike in the single-firm case, in the context of multiple firms is in each firm’s
best interest to bid truthfully not only that portion of the demand curve around its first-best
allocation x∗i but rather a large portion of its demand curve. Even if each firm knows D(x), it
can no longer anticipate l∗i = x
∗
i with precision because it does not know other firms’ demand
curves P−i(x−i) (it may be even unaware of the number of firms being regulated). To be more
precise, a firm will only find it strictly optimal to bid truthfully the portion of its demand curve
that is relevant for the auction clearing. Thus, if firms assign zero probability to the event that
the clearing price will fall below some value, say p, firms can just bid an almost perfectly elastic
(or inelastic for that matter) demand curve for p ≤ p.28 While this oﬀ-equilibrium behavior has
no consequences on the clearing price, and hence, on implementing the first-best allocation, it
does have an eﬀect on firms’ total payments. But because demand schedules are non-increasing
in p, a firm’s total payment will never be greater (and generally smaller) than the Pigouvian
payment.
Finally, the auction mechanism is, like any other VCG mechanism, a non-budget-balanced
mechanism both in and oﬀ equilibrium (unless Xˆi(p) = 0 for all i). Although there is no
27There is, however, one exception: the "single" firm will no longer submit its true demand curve but Pˆ (x) = 0.
But since x is fixed and there is only one firm, this has no allocative implications.
28Going back to the fixed-supply case discussed in the preceding paragraph, the existence of p> 0 could
eventually break the equivalence with the Vickrey and Ausubel auctions in terms of revenues (but not in terms
of allocations).
16
eﬃciency reasons for balancing the budget there may be political economy reasons for doing so
(Tietenberg, 2003).29 As first pointed out by Groves and Ledyard (1977), if there are at least
three agents it should be possible to balance the budget for a variety of mechanisms. The basic
idea is to distribute the surplus or deficit generated by each agent (Di(li) in our case) among the
other agents in some lump-sum manner as to avoid any incentive eﬀects. Behind this idea lies
an implicit "separability" condition that in our case would allow us to either make the payment
Di(li) independent of some firm j’s report (i.e., Pˆj(xj)), as in Duggan and Roberts (2002), or
to perfectly disentangle the contribution of each firm j 6= i’s report to firm i’s payment, as in
Varian (1994). By construction, the auction mechanism lacks of such separability; hence, there
is no way in which the mechanism can be modified to achieve perfect budget-balancing while
retaining its first-best properties.30
There exists, however, an approximate solution. Building upon the idea of Groves and
Ledyard (1977), let denote by D−ij (l
−i
j ) the total payment that firm j would have hypothetically
faced under the same auction mechanism but in the absence of firm i’s demand schedule, where
l−ij is the corresponding number of licenses allocated to j. The regulator can thus fashion a
lump-sum compensation rebate Ri for firm i using these influence-free hypothetical payments.
For example,
Ri =
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
D−ij (l
−i
j )
where n ≥ 2.
This solution assures a perfectly balanced budget (i.e.,
Pn
i=1Ri =
Pn
i=1Di(li)) only in the
limiting case of a large number of firms; otherwise,
P
Ri could be smaller, greater or equal thanP
Di(li). The ratio ρ ≡
P
Ri/
P
Di(li) will ultimately depend on the number of firms and
shape of the demands and marginal damage curves. For linear curves, for example, it can be
shown that for three (symmetric) firms ρ can be anywhere between 0.60 and 1.50, for ten firms
anywhere between 0.90 and 1.11 and for 100 firms anywhere between 0.99 and 1.01. Thus, a
regulator that cannot run a deficit, i.e., constrained to return at most
P
Di(li) to firms, can
inform in advance that it will return only some fixed fraction of the total
P
Di(li) (in the case
29We may also want to take into consideration the general equilibrium reasons of Bovenberg and Goulder
(1996) for not balancing the budget.
30The reason why the complete-information mechanisms of Duggan and Roberts (2002) and Varian (1994) can
balance the budget is because they are based on discrete announcements by firms. In the former firms announce
quantities while in the latter they announce prices. In the auction mechanism firms announce a continuum of
quantity-price pairs.
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of 10 firms this fraction could be 90%).
4 Collusion
The workings of bidding rings or auction cartels have received a fair amount of theoretical
and empirical attention in the auction literature (e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1992; Kemplerer,
2004). In this section I discuss how the auction scheme proposed in this paper performs under
collusive behavior, if sustainable, and whether it requires of any adjustment in order to preserve
its first-best properties.
The way to implement a collusive agreement in our multi-unit auction is not very diﬀerent
from the description of McAfee and McMillan (1992) for a single-unit auction except for some
elements that I will explain below. Cartel firms need to both coordinate on their bidding
schedules and agree on the procedure for sharing the cartel profits. But because cartel members
do not know each other’s demand curves, in implementing the collusive agreement the cartel
organization must itself overcome an adverse-selection problem: it must induce its members to
truthfully reveal their private information. In other words, the cartel itself faces an internal
mechanism design problem. I will first present the optimal (i.e., maximal profits) collusive
agreement and then an internal mechanism the cartel can use to implement such outcome.
4.1 The optimal collusive agreement
Imagine for a moment that there is a relatively large number of independent production plants.
In the non-cooperative equilibrium each plant i operates at its first-best level x∗i and receives
virtually no payback. Imagine now that all those plants belong to a single holding company
subject to the same auction scheme. The holding company is clearly better oﬀ because is not
only operating at the same level (x∗i at plant i = 1, ..n) but also receiving a strictly positive
payback (1/2 of the auction revenues if D0(x) = hx). A good collusive agreement would then
be for plants to coordinate as if they were acting as a single entity. It can be established more
generally, however, that
Proposition 5 The optimal collusive agreement for a cartel of m ≤ n firms is to submit only
one serious bid with the true aggregate demand curve of the cartel, say Pc(xc). One cartel
member submits the serious bid while all the other members submit empty demand schedules.
The optimal collusive agreement delivers the first-best allocation.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
It is remarkable that the auction mechanism, without any sort of adjustment, can deliver
the first-best even when firms are colluding. There are three interrelated reasons for that. First,
paybacks for any given level of licenses are largest when the cartel faces the total supply function
instead of a series of residual supply functions. Second, clean-up costs for any given level of
licenses are lowest when they can be split cost-eﬀectively across all firms in the cartel. Third,
the single-firm analysis has already shown that the level of licenses that minimizes overall costs
(clean-up costs and payments) is the first-best level.
These same three reasons also help explaining why cartel profits are increasing with the
number of cartel members. Unlike in the single-unit auctions of McAfee and McMillan (1992),
where the addition of a "low-valuation" member only contributes to dissipate cartel rents, in
our multi-unit auction the most profitable cartel is an all-inclusive cartel (i.e., m = n). Existing
members may eventually restrict additional participation insofar as it helps to prevent detection
by antitrust authorities.
There are two additional observations. First, from looking at expression (8) it is not diﬃcult
to see that a collusive agreement under the DHM mechanism would depart from the first-best
allocation. Because of the positive constant term Ai(θˆ−i) firms would coordinate on some over-
reporting of their types (i.e., demand curves).31 If we set the constant term to zero, however,
collusive and non-cooperative behavior would be no diﬀerent but payments would be so large
that the (now Groves) mechanism would be of little practical value.
Second, there are many other, yet less profitable, collusive agreements under the auction
mechanism. For example, it is possible to show that firms would benefit if they can coordinate
on some demand reduction. A sub-optimal agreement like this would certainly move us away
from the first best. But there is no good reason for firms to ever coordinate on a sub-optimal
agreement if they can enforce the optimal agreement, as I argue in the next section.
4.2 Implementing the collusive agreement
The arguments made thus far have assumed that the cartel submits only one serious bid and
this is the aggregate demand of cartel members. To do this, however, the cartel has to induce
31Note that the optimal (all-inclusive) collusive agreement under DHM would be defined by the n-report vector
θˆ that solves
minn ·

nS
i=1
Ci(xi(θˆ, θi)) +D(x)

−
nS
i=1
Ai(θˆ−i)
where x =
S
xi.
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its members to truthfully reveal their individual demand curves. In addition, collusive profits
have to be shared among the members in a way that the members would wish to participate in
the cartel and not to deviate at the auction.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) provides a complete description of the two commonly observed
forms of cartel organization: weak cartels, cartels whose members are unable to make transfer
payments among themselves, and strong cartels, cartels whose members can both make transfer
payments and exclude new entrants. While either type of organization may eventually arise in
the single-unit auctions of McAfee and McMillan (1992), for the multi-unit auctions studied in
this paper we must restrict attention to strong cartels.
It is hard to imagine how a weak cartel could achieve any degree of cooperation in the
multi-unit incomplete-information environment of the auction mechanism. In the absence of
after-auction transfers, a week cartel must conform itself with a sub-optimal collusive agreement
in which each member (tacitly or not) agree on shading their bids to some extent. Since a firm’s
dominant strategy at the auction is to bid truthfully, a necessary condition for the sustainability
of such an agreement is that cartel members can detect deviations at the auction. But unlike in
a single-object auction, where "weak-cartel" members coordinate on bidding the seller’s reserve
price, detecting deviations in the multi-unit auction mechanism requires cartel members to
have information on each and every member’s demand curve. In the absence of transfers, it
is impossible for the cartel to devise an internal (incentive-compatible) mechanism that can
provide cartel members with such information prior to the auction.
Paying exclusive attention to strong cartels may seem restrictive but I would argue that in
our context it is the most natural type of organization of the two because licenses are readily
transferable either through bilateral contracts or in the (after-auction) spot market.32 Thus,
the transferable nature of licenses provides the cartel with the needed flexibility to structure
transfer payments without necessarily facilitating its detection.33
Let us then consider a potential strong cartel of m ≤ n members indexed as j = 1, ...,m.
In implementing the optimal collusive agreement of Proposition 5, the cartel organization must
solve two intertwined problems. First, it must put in place an internal scheme that induces
firms to truthfully reveal their individual demand curves to the cartel organization, which, as in
32Although in equilibrium we should not observe any trade of licenses after the auction, in reality there will
be always some trading activity as firms accomodate to factor price variation between auctions.
33Although collusion is less of a concern here (Proposition 5), antitrust authorities may still dislike it in that
it can facilitate the spread-out of collusion through multi-market contacts.
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McAfee and McMillan (1992), we will call the cartel mechanism. Second, the cartel must ensure
obedience to the cartel mechanism, that is, it must be equipped with the ability to detect and
credibly punish deviators.
Suppose for now that cartel has solved the second problem (I will come back to this shortly)
and focus on the first problem. In so doing, consider the following cartel mechanism. Prior to
the oﬃcial auction, cartel members first agree on how to divide cartel profits by determining
shares λj > 0, where
Pm
j=1 λj = 1. One plausible criteria can be historic use of the resource,
that is λj ≈ x0j/
Pm
k=1 x
0
k (in McAﬀee and McMillan (1992) λj = 1/m). Cartel profits are
defined as the diﬀerence between the payment associated to the optimal agreement and the
sum of the non-cooperative payments that cartel members would have faced at the auction
for the same demand schedules reported to the cartel mechanism. After λj ’s are set, cartel
members report their demand schedules P˜j(xj) to the cartel mechanism. Let P˜c(xc) denote the
aggregate demand curve reported by cartel members. The cartel mechanism selects an arbitrary
member to be the serious bidder, say bidder 1, which bids Pˆ1(x1) = P˜c(x1). Remaining cartel
members bid Xˆj(p) = 0 for all j = 2, ...,m.
The cartel mechanism also establishes the way licenses and payments are transferred across
cartel members posterior to the auction. Let denote by lc the number of licenses received by
the serious bidder at the auction and by Dc(lc) the corresponding payment, where Dc(xc) is the
residual damage function faced by the cartel. The cartel mechanism establishes that each cartel
member j will receive an amount of licenses exactly equal to what he would have individually
obtained at the auction for the demand curve that he reported to the mechanism. Member j’s
total payment for the lj licenses will be equal to what he would have individually paid at the
auction, Dj(lj), minus a fraction λj of the cartel profits. Payment Dj(lj) is computed as in the
auction mechanism, that is, using the aggregate demand curve reported by the remaining cartel
members, P˜−j(x−j). More precisely, Dj(xj) ≡
R xj
0 D
0
j(z)dz, where D
0
j(xj) ≡ D0c(xc)− P˜−j(x−j)
for all j.34
Proposition 6 Assuming that the cartel members can agree on the λj’s, it is a dominant
34 In an all-inclusive cartel, i.e., m = n, Dc(xc) is known prior to the auction (Dc(xc) = D(x)). In a partial
cartel, i.e., m < n, Dc(xc) is only learned posterior to the auction. Although the immediate auction results
(i.e., lc, Dc(lc) and D0c(lc) = pˆ) will provide the cartel with insuﬃcient information to fully reconstruct the curve
Dc(xc), I see no reason why the serious bidder, or any bidder for that matter, cannot request information on
Dc(xc) from the auctioneer. Furthermore, and as double-check practice, it may be a good idea to provide bidders
with their own residual supply functions (in case of a mistake in the clearing of the auction, there will be always
some bidder that will find it profitable to report so). If bidders are not entitled to request such information, the
cartel can alternatively use a first-order (linear) approximation for D0c(xc).
21
strategy Nash equilibrium for them to report truthfully to the cartel mechanism, i.e., P˜j(xj) =
Pj(xj) for all j = 1, ...,m ≤ n.
Proof. Given members’ obedience to the cartel mechanism for whatever demand schedules
they choose to report, cartel member j = 1, ...,m ≤ n will report the demand schedule P˜j(·)
that solves (recall the one-to-one correspondence between reporting P˜j(·) and requesting lj
licenses)
min
lj
Cj(lj) +Dj(lj)− λj
Ã
mX
k=1
Dk(lk(lj))−Dc(lc)
!
where lk(lj) is member k’s license allocation as a function of j’s allocation and lc =
Pm
k=1 lk.
The first-order condition is
C 0j(lj) +D
0
j(lj)− λj
Ã
mX
k=1
(D0k(lk)−D0c(lc))
dlk
dlj
!
= 0
But from the auction clearing condition we have pˆ = D0c(lc) = D0k(lk) for all k = 1, ...,m, which
finishes the proof.
Before moving onto the cartel’s second implementation problem, that of obedience with the
cartel mechanism, let briefly touch on three issues. First, the cartel mechanism proposed above
is not the only (incentive-compatible) mechanism available to the cartel. It has the advantage,
however, that by sharing the format of the auction mechanism it makes it easier for members
to understand its workings.
Second, I have little to add on how firms will come to an agreement on the λj ’s other than
pointing out that I see no reason for negotiations to fall apart because it is all about splitting a
pie of an ex-ante unknown size. In other words, the bargaining process for setting the λj ’s does
not involved the type of information asymmetries that are usually associated to negotiation
failure (e.g., Wiggins and Libecap, 1985).
Third, the cartel mechanism (whether the one proposed here or any other) must be exe-
cuted in its entirety prior to the oﬃcial auction, except for the actual transfer of licenses (and
payments) across cartel members. Unlike in a single-object auction where the cartel mechanism
(e.g., "knockout" auction) that decides which of the cartel members will keep the object can
be conducted either before or after the oﬃcial auction (McAfee and McMillan, 1992), in our
multi-unit environment this is simply not possible for both information and incentive reasons.
On the one hand, the serious bidder must be informed of P˜c(xc) before coming to the oﬃcial
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auction. On the other hand, the use of any ex-post bidding procedure for determining how to
allocate lc and Dc(lc) across cartel members (e.g., a knockout auction with a structure similar
to the auction mechanism but for an inelastic supply) will necessary distort member’s (ex-ante)
incentives in communicating with the cartel mechanism.
Let us now look at the cartel’s second problem that of enforcement with the cartel mech-
anism. In the absence of an outside enforcer, the enforcement needed to ensure that all cartel
members comply with the cartel mechanism may come from a grim trigger strategy in the infi-
nitely repeated auction or in some infinitely repeated multimarket contact. A deviating bidder
would be threatened with noncooperative profits in all future auctions (or "contacted" markets)
should she disobey the cartel mechanism. Unlike in the single-object auction of McAfee and
McMillan (1992), the cartel in our multi-unit context requires of no patience from its mem-
bers to maintain cooperation through the oﬃcial auction. The optimal deviation of bidder j,
whether it is the serious bidder (j = 1) or any of the non-serious bidders (j = 2, ...,m), is to bid
an empty demand schedule to the cartel mechanism (so as to reduce its residual supply curve
at the oﬃcial auction to the maximum extent possible) and then bid its true demand curve
Pj(xj) at the oﬃcial auction. But this deviation leaves the deviating bidder strictly worse oﬀ
in an amount exactly equal to its share λj of the otherwise cartel profits.35
5 Extensions
I will show next how the auction mechanism easily accommodates to other commons problems
such as those involving non-uniformly mixed pollutants (i.e., firms’ pollutants are not perfect
substitutes in the damage function) and private externalities.
5.1 Imperfect substitutability of licenses
Consider the case in which social damage is no longer a function of total pollution but, as
in Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Duggan and Roberts (2002), of the firms’ pollution vector.
There are n ≥ 2 firms with (privately known) demand and cost functions Pi(xi) and Ci(xi),
35Like in McAfee and McMillan (1992), there is still the possibility that posterior to the oﬃcial auction the
serious bidder renege the cartel mechanism and run away with the object (lc licenses). Since no other license
holder is willing to sell for less than the auction clearing price pˆ at the open market that may develop after the
auction, the serious bidder could appropriate all cartel profits by simply posting a price pˆ for the lc licenses. One
may argue, however, that since firms are free to sign bilateral contracts for transfering licenses, the run-away
problem could be managed by the writing of bilateral contracts contigent on auctions results (i.e., pˆ, lc, average
paybacks, etc.) and to be called upon should the serious bidder renege the cartel mechanism.
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respectively, where i = 1, ..., n. Pollution damages are denoted by the diﬀerentiable and convex
function D(x), where x = (x1, ..., xn) is the pollution vector. Without perfect substitutability of
pollutants, and hence of licenses, we do not want to insist on a uniform-price auction because it
may be socially optimal that each firm faces a diﬀerent price for licenses at the margin. For the
same reason the regulator wants to make licenses to be firm-specific as to prevent any trading
of licenses after the auction.
Let x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) be the first-best allocation vector (which is interior and unique); then
x∗ satisfies the first-order conditions
−C 0i(x∗i ) ≡ Pi(x∗i ) =
∂D(x∗)
∂xi
(10)
for all i = 1, ..., n.
For the auction mechanism to deliver the first-best allocation, the payment rule of Propo-
sition 4 implies that firm i’s residual damage curve as a function of xi must be
Di(xi) ≡
Z xi
0
∂D(x∗1(y), ..., x
∗
i−1(y), y, x
∗
i+1(y), ..., x
∗
n(y))
∂y
dy (11)
where x∗j (y) is the first-best allocation to firm j 6= i when y licenses are allocated to firm i. It is
easy to see that if firm i’s total payment is given by (11), the solution to firm i’s problem, i.e.,
find the number of licenses li that minimizes Ci(li) +Di(li), satisfies the first-order condition
(10).
To compute firm i’s residual damage curve the auctioneer/regulator will use the bids from
the remaining n− 1 firms to solve a system of n− 1 first-order conditions
Pˆj(xj) =
∂D(x1, ..., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ..., xn)
∂xj
(12)
for j = 1, .., n and j 6= i. Solving the system of equations (12) leads to n − 1 functions of the
form x∗j (xi) for all j 6= i. These functions are then entered into D(xi,x∗−i(xi)) to finally obtain
firm i’s residual damage function (11).
Given definition (11), the auction works exactly as before. The regulator clears the auction
by determining a price pi and number licenses li for each bidder i according to
pi = Pˆi(li) = D0i(li) ≡
∂D(li,x−i(li))
∂li
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and soon after gives i a rebate of αi(li)pili, where (Proposition 2) αi(li) = 1 −Di(li)/liD0i(li)
with 0 ≤ αi(li) ≤ 1.
Before closing this section, it is worth mentioning that collusion, whether implemented by a
weak cartel or a strong cartel, is not possible in this imperfect-substitution world. Weak cartels
cannot detect deviations for the same reasons laid out before and strong cartels cannot make
transfers because licenses are by definition not transferable.
5.2 Private externalities
Consider now the case in which firms not only impose costs on society but also impose costs (or
benefits) on other firms. Fishing in open sea and grazing goats in public land are two "commons"
examples but the analysis here applies more generally to any private externality problem. There
are n ≥ 2 firms. Firm i’s production is denoted by xi and its (diﬀerentiable) profit function
by Πi(x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) where ∂Πi(·)/∂xi > 0 and ∂2Πi(·)/∂x2i < 0. For concreteness, let us
focus on the case of pure private negative externalities, i.e., ∂Πi(·)/∂xj < 0 for all j 6= i (it is
relatively straightforward to generalize the scheme to the presence of both social and private
externalities).
Let x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) be the first-best or joint-profit-maximizing allocation vector (which is
interior and unique); then x∗ satisfies the first-order conditions
∂Πi(x∗)
∂xi
+
X
j 6=i
∂Πj(x∗)
∂xi
= 0 for all i = 1, ..., n (13)
Had the regulator known the size of the externality exerted by each firm at the first-best level,
i.e.,
P
j 6=i ∂Πj(x
∗)/∂xi, he would have just charged a Pigouvian tax equal to τ∗i ≡
P
j 6=i τ
∗
ij ≡P
j 6=i ∂Πj(x
∗)/∂xi to firm i’s output, where τ∗ij measures the (first-best) marginal damage that
i imposes on j. But since regulators generally do not have such information, Varian (1994) has
provided them with the following simple multistage mechanism. First, all firms simultaneously
announce the magnitude of the vector of Pigouvian taxes to be faced by each firm (including
itself). Then the regulator uses firms’ announcements to compute transfers from/to firms as a
function of the production vector x. Finally, output x is decided. Varian shows that transfers
can be structured in a way that the (unique) subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game is
that each firm reports the first-best Pigouvian tax vector and that x = x∗. As expressed by
Varian (1994) in the concluding paragraph of the paper, however, the main problem with this
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multistage mechanism is that it requires complete information by the firms.
The auction mechanism proposed in this paper does not require firms to possess any such
information. It assumes that Πi(x) is firm i’s private information. In the specific context of pri-
vate externalities, the auction mechanism operates as follows. Firms are asked to submit (non-
increasing) demand schedules Pˆi(x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) for i = 1, ..., n.36 The regulator/auctioneer
uses that information to recover "reported" profit functions
Πˆi(xi,x−i) =
Z xi
0
Pˆi(x1, ..., xi−1, y, xi+1, ..., xn)dy
which then he uses to compute the residual damage functions as dictated by Proposition 4
Di(xi) ≡
X
j 6=i
Πˆj(x∗∗1 , ..., x
∗∗
i−1, 0, x
∗∗
i+1, ..., x
∗∗
n )−
X
j 6=i
Πˆj(x∗1(xi), ..., xi, ..., x
∗
n(xi)) (14)
for all j = 1, ..., n and j 6= i.
The first sum in (14) is the "reported" first-best profits of all firms but i in the absence
of firm i and the second sum is the first-best profits of all firms but i when firm i is allowed
to produced xi > 0. As in the basic model, expression (14) tracks down the (first-best) profit
losses that the presence of firm i, as measured by xi, causes on all other agents. Again, it
is not diﬃcult to see that if firm i’s total payment is given by (14), the solution to firm i’s
problem, i.e., find the number of licenses li = xi that maximizes Πi(li,x−i) −Di(li), satisfies
the first-order condition (13). The computation of functions x∗j(xi) for all j 6= i is as in the
previous section: the auctioneer will use the bids from the j 6= i firms and solve the n − 1
first-order conditions as a function of xi.
A simple example may help here (to make it more interesting I will allow for corner solu-
tions). Consider two firms 1 and 2 (or i and j) with profit functions Πi(xi, xj) = (θi−xi−xj)xi ≥
0, where the value of θi is firm i’s private information. For θi > θj the socially optimal solution
is
x∗i =
θi
2
and x∗j = 0
(and for θi = θj = θ the eﬃcient solution is x∗i + x
∗
j = θ/2).
In the absence of regulation firms will produce beyond this joint-profit maximizing level
36Note that in many commons problems these demand schedules will reduce to Pˆi(xi, x−i), where x−i ≡S
j 6=i xj .
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(we may have a total collapse of the resource in that θi < xi + xj for i = 1, 2).37 The auction
mechanism corrects the externalities as follows. Firms are asked to report their demand curves
or types to the auctioneer, say θˆ1 and θˆ2, knowing beforehand that the regulator/auctioneer
will use this information to determine allocations
li =
⎧
⎨
⎩
θˆi/2 if θˆi > θˆj
0 if θˆi < θˆj
and total payments
Di =
⎧
⎨
⎩
θˆ
2
j/4 if θˆi > θˆj
0 if θˆi < θˆj
for i = 1, 2. If θˆi = θˆj = θˆ the regulator flips a coin for deciding who gets the θˆ/2 licenses for a
total payment of θˆ
2
/4 (we assume that the winning firm opts to produce despite making zero
profits).
By letting firm i face a payment equal to firm j’s (first-best) profits had firm i not existed
(i.e., Πj = θ2j/4), it is in firm i’s best interest to submit a truthful bid (i.e., θˆi = θi) regardless
of what firm j bids. This is not surprising since the auction mechanism has collapsed to a
single-object second-price auction.38
6 Final remarks
I have developed a simple auction mechanism for the optimal regulation of a commons resource
when the regulator lacks information about the characteristics of the firms that are being
regulated. The mechanism is developed under the additional assumption that firms know
nothing about other firms’ characteristics. The mechanism is not only simple in that it is based
on commonly used instruments (i.e., transferable licenses) but also remarkably eﬀective in that
it delivers the first-best allocation regardless of the number of firms and on whether they are
acting noncooperatively or collusively. The mechanism yields the eﬃcient allocation even when
37Suppose that is common information that θi’s are i.i.d. over the support [θi, θ¯i], the Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium is
xi =
θi
2
− 2E[θi]−E[θj ]
6
for i = 1, 2 and where E[·] is the expected value operator.
38Since there are multiple socially optimal solutions for the case in which θi = θj , one may be inclined to
replace the coin-flipping allocation by a more equitable allocation such as the following: if θˆi = θˆj = θˆ, then
li = lj = θˆ/4 and Di = Dj = θˆ
2
/8. This allocation rule still yields a truth-telling Nash equilibrium but no longer
in dominant strategies. If, for example, firm i believes θˆj > θi > θj , it may be optimal for i to bid θˆi = θˆj > θi.
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the aggregate supply of licenses is fixed — either because there is a genuine threshold or, more
likely, because the regulator has no control over the aggregate supply.
There are two aspects not treated in the paper that may prove relevant in some commons
problems. First, there may be cases in which emissions (or resource use, more generally) cannot
be perfectly monitored. Then, in addition to the adverse selection problem of not observing a
firm’s type (e.g., abatement costs) the regulator must now overcome the moral hazard problem
of not perfectly observing the firm’s action. In a recent paper, Montero (2005) compares
the performance of two instruments –grandfathered transferable licenses and performance
standards– in such information environment. He finds that in some cases a standard-alone
policy can welfare dominate a licenses-alone policy. In many cases, though, the optimal policy is
to combine licenses and standards. It would be interesting to study how the auction mechanism
extends to the case of imperfect monitoring and to ask whether and to what extent it remains
(second-best) optimal to auctioning oﬀ the licenses subject to a minimum performance standard.
Second, in existing license programs the allocation horizon of licenses is not necessarily tight
to the nature of the investments. If investments depreciate rather quickly, say, in a year, and the
magnitude of the social externality is likely to fluctuate from year to year, it appears optimal
to run a new auction every year. If, on the other hand, investments are long-lived and mostly
irreversible, but the authority allocates licenses via annual auctions, the time-consistent solution
would be for firms to under-invest relative to the first-best level (recall that in the presence of
irreversibility ex-post marginal costs can be significantly lower than ex-ante marginal costs).
Since the nature of an investment is to a large extent firm’s private information, it remains to
be seen whether and to what extent the auction mechanism can handle this additional adverse
selection problem. The regulator/auctioneer must use firms’ bids not only to allocate licenses
eﬃciently across firms at any point in time but also across time, i.e., it must also resolve how
often firms, either individually or a as group, must come to the auction. Perhaps it is optimal
to let firms store current licenses for future use, as permitted in most existing license markets,
and make future auction allocations contingent upon the amount of licenses stored.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Let 1 > λi > 0 be the fraction of licenses allocated to firm i (= 1, ..., n), so firm i receives an
initial allocation of λil, where l is the total number of licenses and
Pn
i=1 λi = 1 (as commonly
observed in practice, λi could be proportional to historic emissions, that is λi ≈ x0i /x0). The
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license market is assumed perfectly competitive (i.e., n large). Let s¯ be the maximum value
the subsidy can take, which by construction fixes the maximum number of licenses to l¯, where
D0(l¯) = s. The regulator sets s¯ suﬃciently high that is always above the first-best level p∗ for
any possible realization of P (x); otherwise, there is no point in using the scheme (in Kwerel
(1977) s is unbounded but in reality we cannot let it go to infinity).
We will demonstrate that the pair (s¯, l¯) is the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome of Kwerel’s
scheme. From the arguments in the text we do not need to consider the case of under-reporting.
Thus, for a reported aggregate demand curve Pˆ (x) ≥ P (x), the subsidy level is s and the market
price of licenses is p = s; hence, firm i’s total compliance costs as a function of s becomes
TCi(s) = Ci(Xi(s)) + s · (Xi(s)− λil(s)) (A1)
where l(s) = D0−1(s). The first term of (A1) is abatement cost and the second term is the net
cost of purchasing licenses (which is negative when the firm is a net seller of licenses). Consider
first the case in which the regulator sets s¯ "close" to infinity. It is not diﬃcult to see that no
firm has incentives to move the outcome away from the pair (s¯, l¯). Since Xi(s = s¯) = 0 for all
i = 1, ..n (firms either shut down operations or install backstop zero-emission technologies), all
firms become net sellers to the government and their total costs, TCi(s = s¯) = Ci(0)−λis¯l¯ < 0,
reach the minimum (recall that l0(s) > 0). Consequently, all firms will submit infinitely large
demand curves Pˆi(xi) so as to ensure that s = s¯.
Consider now the case in which s¯ is "only large" in the sense that for some or all firms
Xi(s¯) > 0. We have that
dTCi(s)
ds
= C 0i ·
dXi(s)
ds
+Xi(s)− λil(s) + s ·
µ
dXi(s)
ds
− λi
1
D00(l(s))
¶
(A2)
But C 0i = −s, so evaluating (A2) at s = s¯ reduces to
dTCi(s)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=s¯
= Xi(s)− λil(s)−
λis¯
D00(l)
Since with over-reporting
Pn
i=1Xi(s¯) < l(s¯), there will be many firms for which dTCi(s¯)/ds < 0
(note that if firms are symmetric it is immediate that dTCi(s¯)/ds < 0 for all firms; if firms
are heterogeneous it may be still be the case that dTCi(s¯)/ds < 0 for all firms). These firms
have no incentives to move the outcome away from s = s¯, so they will over-report by as much
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as possible as to ensure that s = s¯. And since firms for which dTCj(s¯)/ds > 0 cannot fully
counterbalance these over-reporting incentives because at best they can report Xˆj(p) = 0, the
equilibrium outcome will necessarily be the pair (s¯, l¯).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 5
Without loss of generality let us parametrize firm i’s inverse demand function as Pi(xi) ≡
P (xi, θi) where θi is an index of type and ∂P/∂θ > 0 (similarly, the parametrization for the
demand function is Xi(p) ≡ X(p, θi) where ∂X/∂θ > 0). There is a one-to-one correspondence
between a reported demand schedule Pˆi and a reported type θˆi. Consider for the moment only
two firms, i and j. The firms’ reports θˆi and θˆj conducive to the most profitable collusive
agreement are found by solving
min
θˆi, θˆj
C(xi, θi)+C(xj , θj)+[1−αi(li(θˆi, θˆj))]pˆ(θˆi, θˆj)li(θˆi, θˆj)+[1−αj(lj(θˆi, θˆj))]pˆ(θˆi, θˆj)lj(θˆi, θˆj))
(B1)
subject to
xi + xj = li(θˆi, θˆj) + lj(θˆi, θˆj) = l(θˆi, θˆj) (B2)
where pˆ(θˆi, θˆj) ≡ pˆ is the auction clearing price as a function of firms’ bids and li(θˆi, θˆj) ≡ li is
the number of licenses allocated to firm i. In what follows I will omit θˆi and θˆj unless it would
otherwise cause confusion. From Proposition 2 we know that
[1− αi(li)]pˆli = Di(li) = pˆli −
pˆR
pˆj(θˆj)
[Xs(p)−X(p, θˆj)]dp (B3)
where Xs(p) is the social supply function, i.e., D0(x), so Xs(p)−X(p, θˆj) is the residual supply
faced by firm i, i.e., D0i(xi, θˆj); and pˆj(θˆj) ≤ pˆ is the (hypothetical) clearing price in the absence
of firm i’s bid (in terms of Figure 2, pˆj(θˆj) corresponds to pˆ−i). The first-order condition for
(B1) is (allowing for corner solutions)
∂C(xi, θi)
∂xi
dxi
dl
∂l
∂θˆi
+
∂C(xj , θj)
∂xi
dxj
dl
∂l
∂θˆi
+
∂Di(li)
∂θˆi
+
∂Dj(lj)
∂θˆi
≥ 0 (B4)
Recall that −∂C(xi, θi)/∂xi = P (xi, θi). To obtain an expression for dxi/dl use (B2) and note
that collusion optima requires
P (xi, θi) = P (xj = l − xi, θj) = P (l, θi+j) (B5)
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where P (l, θi+j) is the true aggregate demand function. Totally diﬀerentiating (B5) with respect
to l and rearranging leads to
dxi
dl
=
P 0j
P 0i + P 0j
(B6)
where P 0i ≡ ∂P (xi, θi)/∂xi. To obtain expressions for ∂Di(li)/∂θˆi and ∂Dj(lj)/∂θˆi (or ∂Di(li)/∂θˆj),
on the other hand, note that from (B3) we have
∂Di(li)
∂θˆi
=
∂pˆ
∂θˆi
li + pˆ
∂li
θˆi
− ∂pˆ
∂θˆi
[Xs(pˆ)−X(pˆ, θˆj)] (B7)
But Xs(pˆ)−X(pˆ, θˆj) = li, so (B7) reduces to
∂Di(li)
∂θˆi
= pˆ
∂li
θˆi
(B8)
Similarly,
∂Di(li)
∂θˆj
=
∂pˆ
∂θˆj
li + pˆ
∂li
θˆj
− ∂pˆ
∂θˆj
li +
∂pˆj(θˆj)
∂θˆj
· 0 +
pˆRˆ
pj
∂X(p, θˆj)
∂θˆj
dp
Rearranging and inverting i by j leads to
∂Dj(lj)
∂θˆi
= pˆ
∂lj
∂θˆi
+
pˆRˆ
pi
∂X(p, θˆi)
∂θˆi
dp (B9)
Note that since pˆi ≤ pˆ the last term of (B9) is non-negative. Plugging (B6), (B8) and (B9) into
(B4), using (B5) and rearranging, the two FOCs become
∂l(θˆi, θˆj)
∂θˆi
[−P (l(θˆi, θˆj), θi+j) + pˆ(θˆi, θˆj)] +
pˆ(θˆi,θˆj)R
pˆi(θˆi)
∂X(p, θˆi)
∂θˆi
dp ≥ 0 for i and j (15)
By inspection of (15) one arrives at two possible solutions. One solution is for i to report
θˆi = θi+j (i.e., the true aggregate demand curve) and for j to report the corner θˆj = ∅ (i.e.,
Xˆj = 0 for all p). If so, P (l, θi+j) = pˆ = pˆi > pˆj = D0(0), and hence, the FOC for i equals to zero
and the FOC for j is strictly positive. The second solution is just the inverse. Both solutions
are equally optimal (for the firms) and, more importantly, they implement the first-best in that
firms find it in their best collusive interest to submit the aggregate true curve. Extending the
proof to the case of more than two firms and to the possibility of partial collusion (i.e., collusion
among a subset of firms) is straightforward.
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